Prizes! Innovating, Risk Shifting, and Avoiding Contracts and Grants by Schooner, Steven L. & Castellano, Nathaniel E
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2014 
Prizes! Innovating, Risk Shifting, and Avoiding Contracts and 
Grants 
Steven L. Schooner 
George Washington University Law School, sschooner@law.gwu.edu 
Nathaniel E. Castellano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The Public Manager, page 33 (Winter 2014), Forum on "Acquisition: Short-Term Tactics and Long-Term 
Change" 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
33THE PUBLIC MANAGER   |  WINTER 2014
ACQUISITION: SHORT-TERM TACTICS AND LONG-TERM CHANGE
Prizes! Innovating, Risk Shifting,  
and Avoiding Contracts and Grants
by Steven L. Schooner and Nathaniel E. Castellano
From Columbus’s brash proposal to discover an Atlantic route to the East Indies, Lewis and Clark’s epic cross-country expedition to the Pacific Coast, to the Space Race that first landed humans on the moon, government 
institutions have inspired transformational quests and 
pioneering endeavors that slashed the Gordian Knots of 
their time. 
While innovation occurs constantly—incentivized 
by familiar devices such as patents, research grants, public 
procurement, and tax deductions—some barriers prove 
so stubborn that they demand a different type of incen-
tive, a more dramatic and exciting gesture: a prize.
As early as 1567, European sovereigns offered prizes 
for solving the vexing problem of accurately determining 
a ship’s longitude at sea. This culminated with the British 
Longitude Prize of 1714, brought to modern attention by 
Dava Sobel’s bestselling 1995 book, Longitude, The True 
Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific 
Problem of His Time.
America Competes
Today, prizes have become the darling of the Obama 
administration. Exploiting their renewed popularity and 
seemingly unlimited potential, President Obama for-
mally encouraged federal agencies to adopt prize contests 
in his 2009 Strategy for American Innovation.
Soon after, Congress passed the America COM-
PETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, authorizing all 
federal agencies to conduct prize contests. By mid-2014, 
the federal government had sponsored some 350 prizes, 
prompting Professor Steve Kelman of Harvard’s Ken-
nedy School of Government to pronounce that prize con-
tests were “one of the single largest changes in government 
management in the last decade.” 
It’s no surprise that public managers find prizes more 
attractive than contracts and grants. Government man-
agers focused on achieving agency missions in an era of 
scarce resources crave flexible vehicles that are less subject 
to scrutiny. Indeed, we are reminded of the explosion of 
“other transactions authority” activity during the 1990’s 
acquisition reform efforts.
Shifting the Risk
Prizes differ from contracts and grants because they 
shift the risk of failure (meaning, the risk that effort will 
be expended with no compensation) to contestants. The 
government only awards prizes if and when the govern-
ment receives the solution it asks for. Rather than agree-
ing to reimburse the private sector for effort expended in 
advancing the state of the art, the government only pays 
for success. 
Unlike the conventional vehicles they tend to replace—
contracts and grants, which are awarded before the govern-
ment receives what it asks for—the delay in awarding the 
prize until after the contest plays out allows a potentially 
innumerable number of contestants to compete and lever-
ages the “theater” of the contest. This provides the govern-
ment with two distinct advantages not found in other 
innovation-incentivizing techniques. 
First, the ability to include diverse contestants from 
unlimited disciplines, who can introduce novel solutions 
to traditional problems, greatly enhances the likelihood of 
overcoming seemingly impenetrable performance barriers. 
History bolsters this theory. John Harrison, who 
solved the centuries-old problem of calculating a ship’s 
longitude at sea, was a self-taught clock-maker, not a navi-
gator. Napoleon’s 1795 Food Preservation Prize cham-
pion, Nicolas Appert, who created the modern practice of 
canning, was a confectioner. 
Spurring Private-Sector Interest
The second advantage of prizes is that the very nature of 
public competition spurs private-sector interest. Innova-
tors invest their time and energy competing in contests 
hoping to reap significant financial rewards, but also 
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pursuing the priceless imprimatur of success. Winning a 
high-profile government contest garners public attention 
of the type that few innovators could attract or afford 
through other means.
The winner of the Goldcorp Challenge conceded that, 
while the prize barely covered their expenses, “It would 
have taken [our company] years to get the recognition in 
North America that this [single] project gave us overnight.” 
Yet the benefits of prizes do not come without cost. 
Allowing more contestants to participate means that, for 
every winner, there are vast numbers of disappointed con-
testants. Given the nature of the research and develop-
ment process, those disappointed contestants will usually 
have invested far more in the contests than they would 
expend developing a bid or proposal when seeking a gov-
ernment contract or grant. 
And the Loser Is …
History confirms that not all disappointed and empty-
handed contestants walk away quietly. Indeed, the 
enduring legacy of the Longitude Prize was the dramatic 
decades-long dispute between John Harrison, his heirs, 
and the Longitude Board. Unfortunately, amidst the 
current euphoria for prizes, nothing suggests that the 
government has anticipated prize contest disputes, let 
alone provided a straightforward means for contestants 
to obtain judicial review, or any form of due process, to 
resolve those disputes.
It did not take long for modern-day equivalents to 
the Longitude Prize dispute to appear, albeit on a more 
modest scale. In April 2013, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) split a $50,000 prize between two contes-
tants in its Robocall Challenge, which sought effective 
tools to block automated telephone marketing calls. 
When David Frankel’s entrepreneurial invention 
failed to win the prize, Frankel contested the FTC’s deci-
sion. Dissatisfied with the FTC’s responsiveness, Frankel 
filed a bid protest at the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO). When GAO dismissed his challenge for lack of 
jurisdiction, Frankel then brought suit in the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims. More than a year after the contest’s con-
clusion, the court permitted the litigation to proceed. 
Prize contests come in so many different variations 
that the outcome of the Robocall Challenge litigation 
will not remove the potential for inefficient jurisdictional 
litigation to arise from other contests. By failing to waive 
its sovereign immunity or designate a dispute resolution 
forum, the government burdens its own lawyers with 
defending its right to deny contestants due process, while 
saddling disappointed contestants with the onus of find-
ing an adjudicatory forum with jurisdiction, not to men-
tion the uncertainty of not knowing what, if any, due 
process might be available. 
For now, disappointed contestants may attempt 
to bring claims in any number of fora—federal district 
courts, the Court of Federal Claims, agency boards of 
contract appeals, or the GAO—before the merits of 
their claims are acknowledged. At best, this will waste 
the government’s and the private sector’s time, energy, 
and money. At worst, hiding the jurisdictional ball may 
dis-incentivize future participation in prize contests. 
We applaud the trail-blazing government officials will-
ing to experiment with prize contests to solve vexing prob-
lems in an expeditious, cost-effective manner. Nonetheless, 
the government must employ prizes—and consume private 
sector resources—responsibly. 
Sovereign status does not entitle the government to 
act arbitrarily or capriciously. For now, contest-sponsoring 
agencies should respect the private sector’s valuable intel-
lectual capacity and scarce resources and incorporate dis-
pute resolution clauses into their competition guidelines. If 
the government continues to bury its head in the sand, con-
testants play the government’s game at their own risk. 
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